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 Many aspects of the history of the kings of Pontus prior to Mithridates Eupator remain 
unknown to modern scholars. The information that we have is scant and fragmentary, and 
consequently, we often rely on conjectures extracted from allusions, mostly indirect, from which 
sometimes very little can be inferred. Pharnaces I, the grandfather of Eupator, is considered to have 
been the first of the Pontic rulers to venture towards an ambitious conquest policy and, as a result, 
the first to establish contact with Rome
1
. In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of certain 
episodes of Pharnaces' policy which would refute the traditional vision of a permanent enmity 
between Pharnaces and the kingdom of Pergamum. The mutual rivalry with Bithynia would have 
favoured periods of collaboration between those two kingdoms, which we will try to trace based on 
some obscure passages by Justin. 
 The first contact between Pontus and Rome that we know of is in reference to an embassy 
that Pharnaces sent in the year 183 B.C. At the very same time, both an embassy from Rhodes and 
one from Eumenes II also arrived in Rome, the former to protest the bloody conquest of Sinope at 
the hands of Pharnaces, and the latter, to try to settle some uncertain aspects of a dispute that also 
arose between Eumenes and Pharnaces (Polyb.23,9,3-4; Liv.40,2,6; cf. Str.12,3,11). It seems 
logical, as has been argued up to now, that the reasons for this dispute must have had as a 
background the territorial ambitions of Pharnaces, which would culminate in the war that he waged 
against Bithynia and Pergamum, and which ended in 179 B.C. with his defeat
2
. But we find it very 
significative that this first Pontic mission to Rome was sent just after the end of the war between 
Pergamum and Bithynia in the fall of 184 B.C
3
. We ought to consider the possibility that [p.62] 
there was a relationship between this event and the above-mentioned embassies. As was noted, it is 
Justin who gives us a clue to this effect when, upon referring to this war, he relates a well-known 
trick of Hannibal, who had found refuge in the Bithynian kingdom and was general of Prusias' 
army. Hannibal ordered pots with snakes in them to be launched against the enemy fleet, causing 
confusion among "the Pontics"
4
. The term Ponticus appears in the ancient sources, and particularly 
in Justin (37,1,2; 40,1,2; Trog.Prol.32), to describe that which was related to the kingdom of 
Pontus, and it is unlikely that it could refer to troops other than those of Pharnaces, whose kingdom 
already included coastal possessions
5
. There would have been nothing surprising about Pharnaces' 
helping Pergamum during the war: Bithynia, a neighbouring kingdom, was the natural rival of 
Pontus in regard to control of not only the southern coast of the Black Sea and the Thracian 
Bosphorus, but also of Galatia, a strategic territory. Consequently, the embassy to Rome might 
have had as a background the demand by Pharnaces for rewards that Eumenes refused to hand over 
after the war against Prusias. 
 This hypothesis that we are presenting may seem to contradict a passage from Trogus' 
Prologues, from which the opposite might be inferred, that is, that Pharnaces was allied with 
Prusias during this war against Pergamum
6
. Moreover, there is the traditional interpretation given 
to an epigraph in which the victory by Eumenes II over "Prusias, Ortiagon, the Galatians and their 
allies" is mentioned
7
. Regarding the former piece of evidence, it should be noted that Justin's 
Epitome does not mention the subsequent war between Pharnaces and Eumenes; thus, our 
confusion may be due to the shortening of the original account. Justin concludes this book of the 
Epitome with the death of Hannibal, while the Prologues reveal that in Trogus' work this same 
book must have concluded with the coming of Antiochus IV to the throne. In regard to the 
epigraph, nothing forces us to believe that the allies that are mentioned are the Pontics: one must 
remember that, although Ortiagon was a Galatian chief, he is mentioned separately from his people. 
Thus, the allusion could be to other Galatian tribes, or, perhaps more likely, to Philip V of 
Macedon, who helped Bithynia in this war
8
. We should also remember there was a good 
relationship between Prusias' kingdom and the [p.63] Thracians, whom Attalus II had to fight 
(App.Mith.6; OGIS 330; Hopp 1977, 96-98). The presumed cooperation between Pharnaces and the 
Bithynian kingdom was questioned by F. Walbank, but his arguments have not been followed by 
other scholars
9
. 
 If Pontus did, indeed, collaborate in the fight against Prusias and Hannibal, why do the 
Roman sources not mention this participation in more detail? Apart from the fact that Polybius' 
account of this conflict has only reached us in fragments, the fact is that Pharnaces would have 
allied himself with Eumenes, not Rome (cf. Gruen 1984, vol.I, 112). Furthermore, we do not know 
how large a force Pharnaces employed. But above all, one must remember that the literary sources 
are not very favourable to Pharnaces. Polybius treats him with real disdain. He had many reasons to 
do so: first was the conquest of Sinope, the most flourishing Greek colony on Pontic Capadocia 
(Polyb.23.9.3-4; Liv.40.2.6; Ballesteros Pastor 1998, 57); what is more, the foundation of Pharnacia 
from the synoecism of Cotyora and Cerasus, might have harmed Sinope, their metropolis 
(Str.12,3,17; cf. Xen.Anab.5,5,7-10). But, first of all, Pharnaces is criticized for later having 
undertaken expansionist enterprises which put in danger the geopolitical balance of Asia Minor, 
and of Euxinus itself, and which Rome undoubtedly frowned upon. Furthermore, many later 
sources would have had little interest in highlighting the occasions in which Pontus had acted in 
favor of Roman interests as an ally kingdom. Such is the case regarding the help that Mithridates V 
gave to Rome in the Third Punic War, which only Appian mentions (Mith.10).  
 The Pontic War that took place shortly after the Pontic embassy to Rome might have been 
in part due to Pharnaces' dissatisfaction over not seeing his territorial expectations fulfilled. After 
the war against Prusias, Eumenes would have had a "corridor" from his kingdom to the Bithynian 
coast, to the city of Tieium, which Pharnaces laid siege to in 181 B.C. and which bordered 
Amastris, then the western limit of the Pontic territory
10
. Thus, Pharnaces might have expected an 
increase in the coastal territory of his kingdom, which, as we have seen, was at the core of his 
program of government. 
 But the cooperation between Pharnaces and the kingdom of Pergamum is seen even more 
clearly in another passage by Justin. In the speech by Mithridates Eupator to his troops (88 B.C.) he 
specifically mentions that Pharnaces was [p.64] named as the successor to Eumenes II
11
. It is 
difficult to establish precisely when the king of Pergamum took that action or the reasons for it. 
Niese (1903, 74, n.5) pointed to two possible moments: the Peace of Apameia (188 B.C.) or the 
peace of 180/79 after Pharnaces' war. The first of these dates is unlikely due to the absence of any 
mention of the Pontic kingdom in the agreements. The other possibility, that is, after the treaty 
subsequent to the defeat of Pharnaces, makes some sense. It is known that Attalus III was not born 
until 168 B.C. (Allen 1983, 189-94, for discussion); before his birth, Eumenes had had to convince 
his brother, the future Attalus II, not to accept the Roman offers for help in becoming an 
independent king
12
. The naming (perhaps unofficial rather than official) of Pharnaces as successor 
might have been a ploy by Eumenes to dissuade the members of his family from any attempt to 
take the throne against his will. Pontus was at that moment a valuable ally: it maintained 
submissive relationships to Roman power, since its amicitia was instituted at the end of the war and 
would continue into the rule of Mithridates IV, who was also an ally of Pergamum (IOSPE I
2
 402; 
OGIS 375; Polyb.33,12,1). However, at the same time, Pontus shared with Pergamum the suspicion 
of an ever-present threat from Bithynia, which had its eye on taking over the entire southern coast 
of Propontis
13
, and all the more so when about 178-177 B.C. Prusias II returned to his policy of 
rivalry with Pergamum when he married Apame, Perseus' sister (Liv.42,12,2; App.Mac.11,2, 
Mith.2,3; Hopp 1977, 43). Rome, which appears not to have taken a special interest in the fact that 
the excessive strengthening of the kingdom of Pergamum could substantially alter the balance of 
power in Asia, will give a clearly favorable treatment to the Bithynians to the detriment of 
Eumenes, who felt ill-treated by his former protectors (Will 1967, 245; Hopp 1977, 56-58; Burstein 
1980). Perhaps Eumenes proposed an union with Pontus as a means of getting out of an 
uncomfortable international situation. Precisely for that reason, it is difficult to accept another 
hypothesis by Niese, who argues that the decision to make Pharnaces Eumenes' successor would 
have been made directly by Rome (Niese 1903, 74 n.5; [p.65] cf. contra Gruen 1984 vol.II, 554 
n.109). Rome, as we have seen, turned its back on the powerful Attalid kingdom and used the 
dynastic troubles as a means of maintaining its position as arbiter among the kingdoms of the East 
(Badian 1958, 111). The union between Pontus and Pergamum would have undoubtedly meant the 
creation of a great power in Anatolia, which would have kept a suffocating grip on Bythinia and 
Galatia, as well as an important presence on the coast of Euxinus. In any case, although the 
recognition of Attalus III as successor to the throne of Pergamum would have caused Pharnaces' 
aspirations to disappear, their memory would have been perpetuated in the pro-Pontic sources, 
which represents the taking of Asia by Mithridates Eupator more as a reconquering of what 
belonged to him by inheritance than an appropriation of a foreign territory
14
. 
 Pharnaces was, then, the first Pontic king to undertake a foreign policy of great magnitude 
and he made his kingdom an important power within the framework not only of Anatolia, but also 
of Euxinus itself. Thus, the expansion of his interests towards the Northern Euxinus, seen in the 
treaty with Chersonesos (IOSPE I
2
, 402), could have been recorded by subsequent Roman 
historians as an actual annexation of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, which would later be reflected in 
the time of Eupator as part of the ancestral territory of the Pontic crown (Iust.37,1,9; App.Mith.55, 
55, 107, BC1,76; Vell.2,22,3). The union between Pontus and Pergamum would have been a big 
step forward in the formation of a great Pontic state. Although Pharnaces failed in his attempts, 
Mithridates Eupator was to return to the old aspirations of his grandfather, which served in part as a 
justification for his conquest policy. 
 
* This paper has been drawn up within the search group HUM0441 of II P.A.I. of Junta de 
Andalucía. 
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